regulatory burden for Canadian Companies. Such statements suggest that American securities regulation is a model for centralization and efficiency. They also suggest that the American model could be transposed to Canada. These two statements require careful analysis which we will discuss here from the viewpoint of concentration and competition.
Market participants agree that a dynamic and innovative market is essential to maintain and develop the securities industry in Canada. In theory, innovation and dynamism go hand-in-hand with competition. In the United States, competition between stock markets grew in the 1990's and played a decisive role in reducing transaction costs and stimulating innovation. In Canada, to the contrary, the financial system has become progressively concentrated and the six large banks, in addition to controlling most banking activity, control two-thirds of brokerage firms through their subsidiaries.
Dealers, through the IDA and the TSX Group, the single remaining market group, play an important regulatory role. The level of concentration in the Canadian financial market has become extreme. The Canadian situation is therefore totally different from that which exists in the United States. This concentration is in part the result of a wish to improve the competitive position of the Canadian securities market faced with an attractive and very dynamic American market. However, proposals respecting the regulatory structure in Canada cannot ignore this reality and the transposition of an American model, although very different from what is generally said, cannot take place without significant adjustments.
The introduction of the dimension of competition into the debate surrounding securities regulation in Canada is essential for several reasons. Firstly, market participants all wish for a dynamic and innovative market; these two characteristics are generally the hallmark of competitive markets. Secondly, several theoreticians of regulation maintain and demonstrate that regulation does not always have a public interest orientation, namely the correction of market dysfunctions and consumer protection. Private interest theories see the regulatory process as a competition between interest groups where the best organized and structured groups are able to capture the benefits of regulation to the detriment of less organized groups 3 . Becker (1983) shows that the most highly concentrated sectors are more likely than others to impose their priorities. Capture theory defends an extreme situation where the regulatory process is subservient to the needs of an industry.
Mechanisms which may lead to such situations are the differences in levels of expertise, transfers of human resources from the sector to the regulatory organization and vice versa (the revolving door process) and the infiltration of organizations by upper-level industry staff. Here again, capture is more likely when concentration is great. Furthermore, it has become impossible to deal with securities regulation without dealing with the banking sector, which owns the main brokerage firms in Canada. The main objective of this study is therefore to illustrate the process of concentration of the Canadian financial sector while, however, going beyond the narrow framework of financial corporations. These play a growing and important role with regulatory organizations and this role must be examined. A parallel with the American situation will be drawn.
We will begin by analysing the evolution of the American financial system and its regulation. American securities regulation is more complex than it initially seems, despite recent changes giving broader powers at the federal level. It is therefore important to understand the main characteristics of American financial regulation. It is also useful to review the current regulatory systems in Canada. This is the second objective of this study. This exercise will give us a better understanding of the enormous differences which separate these two systems and reveal the fact that, in many areas affecting the financial world, American regulation is very broadly decentralized and competitive (third section). In the United States, the SEC may be considered a regulatory monopoly with respect to important securities, in the face of a competitive and fragmented industry. In Canada, provincial securities regulation creates a form of regulatory competition in the face of a very heavily concentrated industry. The establishment of a national commission will lead to the setting up of a regulatory monopoly. Authorization of the mergers of banks, which own the main brokerage firms, and the growing concentration in this sector, seems to be leading Canada to oligopoly. According to the forecasts of regulatory theoreticians, a situation where a regulatory monopoly governs an oligopoly is potentially dangerous. This cannot be ignored in the present discussion surrounding the restructuring of securities regulation in Canada.
1. The American system: market competition, regulatory monopoly
The level of competition in American securities markets is significant and grew rapidly during the 1990's. The United States General Accounting Office (GAO) states that in March 2002, the SEC oversaw nine exchanges, the over-the-counter market and seventy alternative trading systems (ATS) as well as twelve clearing houses 4 . The existence of several exchanges stimulated competition, but the growth of ATS was the major element in the reduction of transaction costs (Benhamou and Serval, 1999 clear that the development of ATS played a major role in the overall reduction of transaction costs and improvement of the quality of services.
In the United States, the stock market has become progressively more competitive, the number of institutions offering trading services has grown, and transaction costs have decreased. It does not appear that this evolution reduced neither liquidity nor the quality of information, in particular because of the existence of data consolidation systems. The regulation of this large collection of institutions and organizations is entrusted to the SEC, which has intervened several times to stimulate competition. It has also promoted the emergence of ATS, despite the fact that setting up these systems fragments trades and potentially harms liquidity. Faced with such fragmentation, a single regulatory body might be best. However, American regulation is not totally centralized and it is, moreover, opposed and sometimes even connected with the recent setbacks of several large corporations. when talking about small issues.
Criticisms of centralized regulation
The American regulatory system is the object of criticism which cannot be ignored. It may be grouped into three sub-headings. For several observers, the centralizing influence is one of the factors contributing to the multiplication of accounting and financial scandals. For other authors, the centralized system eliminates regulatory competition and impairs the ability for rapid adaptation of regulation to market evolution. Finally, American securities regulation is considered burdensome and costly.
The accounting and financial scandals argument
It seems paradoxical to invoke financial scandals which mainly affected American businesses to invoke securities centralization in Canada, as the chairman of the OSC Several researchers also studied the rate of lawsuits after adoption of the Act, and observed a non significant temporary lessening in lawsuits over securities (Bajaj et al., 14 ). The post-PSLRA period saw a very high number accounting readjustments and therefore the possibility of lawsuits. It is therefore difficult to say that the post-and pre-PSLRA eras are similar. For several authors and jurors, the PSLRA had the advantage of placing issuers and intermediaries under the same statute, which was not the case when lawsuits were taken at the State level. Thus a national market applied a national law. However, as Weiss et al. (2000) and Loomis (2000) described, different circuit courts applied the uniform act in an extremely varied manner, by taking diametrically opposed positions on significant aspects such as insider trading. (Painter, 1998) . At the end of 2001 and 2002, the SLUSA tried to put an end to several lawsuits initially commenced at the State level.
They dealt with the issue of fixed-income securities 17 and brokers against whom three cases had to be abandoned 18 . In particular, the lawsuit against Merrill Lynch 19 , was considered to fall under the SLUSA and was prescribed. In all the cases, the courts considered that the lawsuits taken at the State level could not have been because of the SLUSA.
For Coffee (2002) Based on the American example, it does not seem that the Enron affair can be a very solid argument to require uniform securities legislation in Canada.
The regulatory competition argument
Regulatory competition is the situation under which, in a given area, economic agents may choose the regulatory system which governs them. Such a system prevails in the United States in the field of company law, where Delaware offers what appears to be the most attractive company law. Such a regulatory structure allows differences to exist between jurisdictions and may generate a race to the bottom. However, this does not seem to happen. In fact, in a properly functioning economy, businesses which opt for a less strict system tell investors that they present additional risk and thus see their cost of capital grow accordingly.
Regulatory competition may lead to a situation which seems sub-optimal because of inter-jurisdictional differences. However, it presents two major advantages. An analysis of regulatory competition is beyond the scope of this study. However, it was important to show that regulatory uniformity is not the only means available and that competition between authorities, widely practiced in the United States, has significant advantages.
American regulatory costs
It is difficult to maintain that an alignment of the Canadian regulatory system with that of 
Conclusion
The United States practices strong regulatory competition or a two-level (local and national) system in several areas, such as company law and banking. In the area of securities, regulation of local issuers remains with the States. The progressive encroachment of the federal government, particularly in terms of lawsuits, is criticized and alternative models of regulation based on competition have been proposed. Finally, the American financial landscape includes a large number of institutions and markets. It is fundamentally different from Canadian financial markets.
The Canadian market: regulatory competition, quasi-market monopoly
The Canadian financial system is traditionally an oligopoly, according to Bordo et al., 1993) . To assess the Canadian situation, we successively review the banks and the brokerage industry, the exchange, the clearing houses, and the alternative trading systems 
Clearing houses
CDS is the sole Canadian entity offering deposit and clearing services for securities other than derivatives 31 . The CDS offers electronic clearing services which allow participants to declare, confirm and settle securities transactions. The institution is governed at the federal level by the Bank of Canada, and at the provincial level, by the Ontario and Quebec securities commissions 32 . CDS is a private corporation owned by the large Canadian banks, the IDA and the TSX Group inc. 33 .
The Canadian Derivatives Clearing Corporation (CDCC), a private business corporation 34 , issues options, futures and options on interest rate futures and on shares and clears them. These contracts are traded on the Montreal Exchange. 35 The CDCC is recognized as a SRO in Quebec. It is subject to the joint supervision of the Quebec and Ontario securities commissions. The Montreal Exchange is now the sole shareholder of CDCC 36 .
Alternative trading systems in Canada
According to certain participants, the TSE has for a long time been afraid of competition Toronto., and Candeal.ca Inc. 40 owned by the TSX Group inc. and brokers 41 . In despite of the emergence of a more favourable regulatory pattern, the markets' conditions seem to have limited the venue of ATS in the Canadian market. Their number and their transaction volume are low.
3 Regulatory monopoly and market competition in Canada
The provincial regulatory securities commissions delegate part of their powers to SRO, which regulate their members and supervise intermediation in the Canadian market.
Canadian exchanges are self-regulating for members and markets. The disappearance of the Western exchanges and the redefinition of the role of the Montreal Exchange have profoundly affected the traditional situation. Self-regulation of members has become the prerogative of the IDA 42 and market self-regulation is currently the responsibility of RS Inc., owned by the IDA and the TSX Group 43 . Self-regulation, which was previously entrusted to each Canadian exchange, is now more or less under the aegis of a single institution.
Market regulation
For ATS to function, a new generation of SROs must be created. These providers of regulatory service, recognized by securities authorities, supervise markets and may impose disciplinary measures. Each ATS must be governed by a supplier of regulatory services. The TSX has thus created a subsidiary from its regulatory division, named RS 46 . RS Inc. is a monopolistic not-for-profit business corporation "independent" of its two shareholders. When an ATS wishes to be established, it must come to an agreement with RS Inc. or an exchange, this last option being somewhat theoretical as ATS compete with exchanges. RS Inc. has become a de facto monopoly for market self-regulation.
Member regulation
Brokers trading on one of the exchanges must be members of a SRO, which governs the broker-client relationship, and sets out rules of ethics and minimal capital requirements to ensure investor protection. In Canada, this self-regulation of members is the mission of the IDA and the Montreal Exchange.
The traditional role of the IDA is to represent the national securities industry. Following the process of demutualization, and the abandonment by the TSE of member regulation in 1996, the IDA also became an SRO 47 . The IDA registers representatives of participants, ensures that participants and their representatives meet professional standards for qualification, minimum capital, internal organization and manages clients' complaints 48 .
Everywhere in Canada except in Quebec, the IDA is a monopoly because it is the only recognized SRO 49 . 
Conclusion
The Canadian financial sector is therefore highly concentrated. 8,000 American banks correspond to nine Canadian banks. Seventy trading systems for securities operating in the United States are served by twelve clearing services. Canada has only one exchange group, two clearing agencies, one regulatory service and three ATS, which are essentially under the direct or indirect control of the large banks and their related brokerages. To our knowledge, no developed country presents such a high level of banking, financial and self-regulatory concentration. The financial aspect is governed by the provincial securities commissions. The centralization proposals for regulation of securities responsibilities will, faced with such a group, lead to a single securities commission.
Findings and implications
The analysis of the Canadian and American situations for securities regulation leads to three important findings for public policy in Canada. Firstly, the American regulatory framework is complex, has not proven its effectiveness and is not transferable to Canada.
Secondly, the structures of the industries regulated in the two countries are totally different. Finally, the risks of significant influence by the industry on the regulatory framework or even regulatory capture are high in Canada.
We have put forward the fundamental differences which exist between market organizations and securities regulation in Canada and the United States. The American banking and securities markets include a very large number of participants, which strongly compete with each other. The situation is totally different in Canada, where activity is highly concentrated. A regulatory response must take this major difference into account.
The United States enjoys regulatory competition in the field of company law. In the banking sector, a dual system has been set up which also allows a certain form of competition. Securities regulation is segmented, as small local issuers are governed locally. The transfer of the American regulatory system to Canada is therefore difficult to conceive. On the basis of a standard established at the level of gross proceeds of issue, a Canadian SEC would be responsible for less than ten percent of initial offerings.
In the securities area in particular, the United States is considered to have burdensome, As Coleman pointed out in 1992, a model similar in certain respects to that taken by the European Community could, by instituting mutual recognition, improve the current system while preserving a certain level of regulatory competition which seems essential, given the concentration of institutions and markets. 
